On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects

Book excerpt: The author makes a case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience. A natural thought about the first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." He goes even further and claims that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present." That there is something unique about me and the things of which I am aware. This book represents a new take on an old view, known as solipsism, which maintains that people's experiences give them grounds for believing that they have a special, distinguished place in the world--for example, believing that only they exist or that other people do not have conscious minds like their own. The author maintains that the version of solipsism he argues for is capable of resolving some seemingly intractable philosophical problems--both in metaphysics and ethics--concerning personal identity over time, as well as the tension between self-interest and the greater good.